

# THE CONTOURS OF STATE LED ANTI NAXAL OPERATIONS IN ODISHA

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**Abstract:** The current article examines the Naxalite movement of India in general and Odisha in particular, noting its ideological opposition to the existing democratic arrangement and armed struggle as its mode of asserting rights for oppressed tribal and peasant communities. The violent proclivities of the movement—such as attacks on public infrastructure and fatalities—pose a serious challenge to national development and security. Focusing on Odisha, the study employs a qualitative, diagnostic research framework of oral histories, and in-depth interviews. It explores government security initiatives, development interventions, and surrender-rehabilitation policies to counter Naxal violence and achieve sustainable peace in the region.

**Keywords:** Naxalite; Ideological; Marginalized; National Security; Case study; Surrender Naxal.

## INTRODUCTION

The article on the contours of state-initiated anti-Naxal operations in Odisha is particularly apt as it critically assesses the new strategies being adopted by the state in responding to left-wing extremism. It also points to the transition away from traditional militarized intervention to more holistic means involving development, intelligence-based policing, and community outreach. Odisha, as a principal theatre of Naxalite activities, is a microcosm of India's wider internal security dilemma. Through this analysis, the article gives one a vision of the successes and failures, and political and social implications of state interventions, and thus contributes to debates about security, governance, and rights in conflict-ridden tribal areas.

The Naxalites claim that the present form of democracy is not people's democracy. This is to be replaced by waging a war through armed revolution. The Bourgeoisie class has been historically exploiting the landless tribals and peasants for centuries. The landless labour and tribals should hold gun to protect their interest. The Naxalites believe that the power comes from the barrel of the gun. They propagate that without violence, one cannot achieve his right and entitlement. They provide them armed training and make them ready to fight against their own state and people. Numerous innocent citizens, state police officers, and political leaders have been slaughtered by the Naxalites' frightening violence. several banks have been pillaged a number of

residences and PDS godowns have been looted, and hundreds of schools, hostels, panchayat buildings, roads, bridges, railway stations, and railway lines have been demolished by Naxalites. They seriously harm the social and economic infrastructure each year by destroying public property valued at a few billions of rupees.

The present study represents a diagnostic research design. Census data, the director general of police, the department of home affairs, the government of Orissa, the director of prisons, the district police office, the director of intelligence, block profile data of the study areas, journals, periodicals, and reference books were among the primary and secondary sources used to create the study's database. Interview schedules were used to gather primary data from residents of the Naxal-affected area. In the present study, the researcher has used qualitative method of data collection like historical analysis (oral history), narrative method, case study and in-depth interview method to collect primary data. The study area was undivided Koraput district in Odisha.

This paper is logically organized into four separate parts, each covering a key aspect of the Naxalite movement in India. The first part outlines the ideational context for the movement and focuses specially on how anti-Naxalite operations evolved and were carried out. The second part critically discusses the administrative measures the state apparatus employed to deal with the multifaceted nature of Naxalite insurgency. The third section presents an analytical evaluation of the rehabilitation programs focused on both

security forces and surrendered Naxal cadres, identifying the state's reintegration efforts and conflict transformation. The concluding section addresses the legislative and policy regime imposed to address the socio-political and security challenges posed by the Naxalite phenomenon, thus emphasizing the legal-institutional response to insurgency management and sustainable peace building.

Sahni (2008) critique anti-Naxal operations in terms of national security and counter-insurgency. Here, the Naxalite movement is conceptualized as an internal security threat to the sovereignty and democratic state institutions of India. Banerjee (2006) states that the operations are conceptualized as needed to install state authority, provide rule of law, and defend democratic processes. anti-Naxal operations for their human rights violations, particularly of tribal groups, marginalized groups, and activists. Anti-Naxal operations must be supplemented—or even substituted—by strong welfare and development programs. Saha (2010) describes anti-Naxal operations as expressions of state dominance, class struggle, and neo-liberal authoritarianism. anti-Naxal operations in India is intricate and multi-faceted. Chatterjee (2004) describes while some scholars justify the operations as a necessity for ensuring law and order, others point out their limitations, excesses, and consequences.

Banerjee (1980) and Gautam Navlakha (2012) contend that revolutionary violence is a symptom of unaddressed agrarian and tribal unrest. They point out that peacebuilding has to deal not only with disarmament but also the root cause of socio-political issues—like land alienation, violations of forest rights, and denial of democratic participation. Ajai Sahni (2007) also criticizes the government's predominantly militarized approach to revolutionary violence on the basis that "peace without justice is unsustainable." He promotes inclusive government and legal empowerment of the marginalized populace. On the other hand, researchers such as Bibhu Prasad Routray (2011) also agree with the need for a twin strategy—balancing security operations with development and dialogue, albeit being skeptical of the Maoists' sincerity in peace. Authors such as Sanjay Basu and Rajat Kujur (2006) point out that although negotiations can temporarily curb violence, trust deficit, nonimplementation, and state indecision frequently undermine such initiatives. Nandini

Sundar (2016), for example, points to the manner in which state-driven development schemes—such as mining and industrialization—actually fuel conflict more than resolve it. Ajai Sahni (2010) states that the state needs to enforce rule of law in Naxal-dominated regions through effective policing instead of militarization. He condemns coercive operations and emphasizes that any coercive effort should be taken in an intelligence-driven and rights-based manner. Kujur (2008) describes how the Naxalite surrender policy can only be effective when surrendered ex-rebels are guaranteed security, economic rehabilitation, and dignity. Andhra Pradesh is frequently cited as a model state. Sudeep Chakravarti (2012) in his ethnographic study posits that until the state establishes trust through continued governance reforms, all the might is powerless to eliminate the movement. Prakash Singh (2011) has proposed a three-pronged approach—Clear (neutralize the militants), Hold (sustain security presence), and Build (launch development projects and governance).

To eradicate Naxal violence in various regions of the state, the state of Odisha has implemented a number of counterstrategies and programs. To identify a Naxalite among the Tribes, the state police have developed a special technique. It is evident that the state police and central security forces stationed in the Naxal-affected area face an enormous challenge in identifying a Naxalite among the tribal people. The indigenous people serve as the human shield for the Naxalites. To identify a Naxal within the indigenous tribal population, the security forces must adhere to a number of crucial criteria. These criteria include: (1) someone who goes missing and then reappears a few days later with altered body language; (2) a uniform; (3) weapons and ammunition; (4) a hostile appearance; and (5) concealing oneself from the authorities. (6), there is an outsider in the village; (7), his attitude towards the villager changes; (8) people's information is obtained; (9) people are asked about the foreigner and he is not a villager; (10), we arrest people and gather information about others. We get comprehensive data about the individuals we suspect. The DIB/SIW occasionally visits the village to get information on each resident, note any family members, get case specifics from the elderly, and confirm their whereabouts, primarily by following up and eliminating each person individually.

Since the Naxalites typically move in a human shield, it can be challenging for the authorities to identify or eradicate them (tribal population). Police find it difficult to shoot villagers when they are among them. The cops must use force to defend themselves when the Naxalites begin shooting at them. Following the events in Bastar, the federal government issued certain instructions stating that police should refrain from striking Naxalites where there is a human shield. When attacking security officers, the Naxalites do not adhere to any established protocols.

According to one of the police officers, there is no precise technique used by the police to distinguish between Naxals in various tribal settlements and hamlets. He acknowledged that many innocent tribal people are injured during firefights because they approach the police to defend the Naxals. Because of their intimate relationship with the public, police intelligence is now more accurate and reliable. One of the retired IPS Officers revealed that the success of police operation is based on human intelligence and proper identification. However, occasionally, when the police invade a certain region, shooting occurs, killing some village residents who came to defend the Naxalites. If members of the Naxal party shoot at police officers, the officers cannot stand by and allow the Naxals kill them and then call themselves martyrs.

Due to local forest dwellers' and tribe members' lack of collaboration, police intelligence was formerly quite poor. The Naxals had little trouble gathering information about the movements of security guards. Tribes in Naxal-affected areas now find Odisha police to be more amiable and acceptable with time. The broader population is providing them with surface-level knowledge. However, the public does not support them as much as the Naxals do. For instance, on December 25, 2013, the Maoists demolished the Padia Block block office in the Malkanagiri district. It demonstrates that information about the Naxal operation has not been gathered by police intelligence.

The police agency uses certain strategies to get closer to residents in the naxal-affected areas in order to improve intelligence. To better connect with the tribal people and other residents of the Naxal-affected area, the police agency implemented a fresh approach. The district police

is trying to (1) Remove the trust deficit (2) False cases are not to be registered (3) Save them from other harassment (4) Earn the confidence – high and mighty approach is to be avoided (5) their sentiment is to be appreciated (6) Sensitisation of police by training to be closer to people (7) Deal with them in polite manner (9) Do not call tribal to a police station again and again without any reason (10) Do not drag them to police station without sufficient reasons (11) To remove fear of innocent tribal from police. All these aspects are given importance to build the confidence of poor and destitute people over the Odisha police.

One of the retired commandant of Odisha police urged that (1) Odisha government should establish a mini assembly of tribal in Koraput to understand the problem of the tribals and settle their matter urgently (2) Proper administrative reform is a must (3) The high officials should visit the district and remote areas to build the confidence of people over police (4) They should personally involve themselves with people and they should organize the Janadlat like Naxalites to solve the issue of tribal (5) Shifting of responsibility attitude of the officers have aggravated the situation (6) Lack of interest of the coastal officers to work for tribal.

The BSF has been planning a lot of civic engagement initiatives to help the underprivileged in isolated Naxal-affected areas. Among these programs are medical camps, sporting events, book distribution to schoolchildren, and the provision of radio transmitters, television sets, clothing, and other necessities to the local populace. About 60 Civic Action Camps have been held in Chhattisgarh and about 70 in Odisha, including medical camps, after the BSF's induction. More than 6000 individuals received medical care and

The Naxalites mobilize and indoctrinate village people through their Jananaty Mandaali (a cultural wing of Naxalites). Bipin Mishra, Ex-Director General of Police told that Naxalites do not have any definite cultural troupes. The leftist organizations have some cultural troops. We do not have any cultural troupe to counter the Naxalites cultural troupe. But the police should form a cultural troupe, which will create National feeling and national consciousness among the tribal. These troops will visit from village to village to create patriotic feelings. There should be village play, hamlet play against the consequence of human

killings. There should be legal awareness to make the people conscious about the consequence of supporting a Naxal outfits. He emphasized that (1)Teacher/ doctor should frequently visit the village,(2) Police, forest officers and excise should visit much less to the area without any reason,(3) Introduction of Pala, Daskathia, Khanjani, Mrudanga in that area so that they can be involved with cultural milieu.

One of the district cadre police officers in Malkanagiri replied that police department is created to maintain law and order in the state. Police is not authorized to perform any drama, dance, and patriotic play to attract the tribals. The Naxals are trying to attract the illiterate and innocent tribals by performing dance, drama and song in the tribal dialect and they propagandize the negligence of the government against the state. The present police have extended their support to the public for peace and tranquility.

The security personnels adopt specific method of gathering information about Naxalites. One of the senior officers told that to detect a person as Naxal the police has to mainly depend on the intelligence wing of both the State Intelligence Wing (SIW) and District Intelligence Bureau (DIB). He explained that the intelligence network, the backbone of any administration, should develop its infrastructure and manpower to provide better intelligence in order to strengthen the Naxal intelligence. They have to strengthen their human intelligence. Still the police intelligence is not able to detect all the Naxal dalams operating in different part of the state due poor relation with the local tribals. Sometimes the local people do not provide intelligence to the police due to lack of trust between anti-Naxalite forces and tribals leading to failure of human intelligence- the most important resource in fight against Naxalites.

During the time off interview, it was noted that numerous police officers acknowledged that we have lost many of our beloved officers to Naxalite attacks and that police are having a difficult time detecting the Naxalites in distant regions of the undivided Koraput district as a result of intelligence failure. As soon as the Naxalites believe that his informant is giving the police information, they murder him. The tribal people experience a terror psychosis as a result, and they are reluctant to provide the police any information. Instead, they work better with Naxal groupings.

One of the IPS officers retorted that the police use Chowkidar, Gramrakhi, the District Intelligence Bureau, the Special Intelligence Wing, and Spy (a trustworthy private villager) to gather information. Due to appropriate effort and effective public-police coordination, the police have currently improved their intelligence capabilities. The public has developed trust in the police as a result of the idea of "people's friendly police," and they are assisting the police in many ways.

To combat the Naxalites' mobile warfare methods, the state police are implementing new tactics. For the Naxalites, mobile warfare is a crucial combat ability. In the past, police forces lacked the necessary expertise to combat the Naxalites' mobile warfare. The unadulterated jungle in Malkanagiri, Koraput, and Rayagada districts made it extremely difficult to detect the Naxalites. A hill was quite hard to encircle. The movement had benefited from the unadulterated forest. Once more, the security staff lacked solid understanding of the local topography. In order to discourage the security forces, the Naxalites used hit-and-run strategies. In order to combat the Naxalites' mobile warfare, security forces are currently receiving various forms of sophisticated training. They are currently doing a great job of defeating and discouraging the Naxal factions. The Rural Intervention System has produced fantastic results in combating the Naxals' mobile warfare. One senior police officer said, "You have to ambush them, don't wait for them to do it." Instead than letting the war come to your house and waiting for them, take it to theirs.

A recent development in the Naxalite movement is Balsangathan. Balsangathan refers to the practice of Naxalite recruiting young boys and females to work as couriers for various Dalams. They also give information on how the cops are moving around the village. The police had no set plan in place to deal with the Naxalites' Balsangathan. Parents of marginalised and tribal people residing in Naxal-affected areas are being made more aware by the police. In order to support the holistic development of Dalit and tribal children, the district government supports organisations like as Bal Bikas Kendra, which offers value-based non-formal education, free school lunches, free education, and free school cycles. By hosting games, sports, and other leisure activities, the district government dissuades

parents from sending their kids to the Naxal group. The police have undoubtedly benefited from all of these initiatives in their efforts to separate the tribal youngsters from the Bal Sangathan. A Bal Sangathan who is gently questioned and comforted by security guards over the presence of the Naxalite might be easily identified by the police intelligence branch. Additionally, the police teach them not to carry weapons and encourage them to attend school and live happier, better lives.

The security forces respond to the challenge posed by female Naxalites in a variety of ways. According to one former DG of police, women were not heavily indoctrinated into the Naxalite movement during its early stages. Currently, their better half joins the movement when the husband does. The cadre was forcibly forming physical relationships with the village's female members and girls during the initial phase. In the village, Naxalite cadres occasionally raped women, and they reported this to the police. In the first phase, the Naxal cadres were able to identify the issue, and in the second phase, they brainwashed women to avoid it. The cadres, both male and female, socialise and develop sexual relationships with one another.

According to a top district police official in Koraput, the state administration is using the following guidelines to deter girls and women from joining the Naxal group:

- Sensitization of village women through media about the sexual exploitation of women.
- Recruiting young and dynamic girl and imparting high skilled training to them to counter the women Naxalite cadres.
- Attract them through proper rehabilitation and resettlement scheme.
- Constructive welfare programs for girls for better socio-economic position

One of the Special Operation Group (SOG) members opined that we generally prefer not to hit women Naxalite cadres until and unless they raise their weapon against us. However, if a female cadre fires at us during a firefight, we shoot her as well to protect ourselves. Through the media, we represent and spread the idea that Naxal cadres sexually exploit women. In the Naxal-affected area, a civil society awareness campaign is held.

Unlike Salwa Judum in Chattisgarh, the state government of Odisha lacks a Jan Jagaran taem to designate citizens to fight the Naxalites. The Chatisgarh government's Jan Jagaran movement (Salwa Judum) has already failed. The Naxalites killed a large number of innocent persons during this movement. The Jan Jagaran movement in Chattishgarh received criticism for this from a variety of sources. "The state government of Odisha is very careful about the life and property of people who are living in backward tribal districts, especially Naxal affected area," one of the top IPS officers stated.

Our security forces take great care to ensure that no civilians are killed during the anti-Naxal campaign. To combat the Naxalites, the state administration has established its own security forces by providing them with cutting-edge police training. Involving local residents in an anti-Naxal campaign conducted by state and federal security forces will be a risky strategy.

According to a retired Additional SP in Koraput, who spent many years serving as an inspector and officer-in-charge in various police stations inside the Naxal belt, one should not consider organising a people's army to combat Naxal violence. Since their lives will be in grave danger, the defenceless villagers shouldn't be exposed in front of the Naxals. Their lives and means of subsistence will suffer as a result. Once more, the family members of civilians who take part in anti-Naxal operations may be killed by the Naxals.

Our security forces are competent enough to eliminate Naxals," retorted one of the retired DG police. In several regions of the state, the DVF, BSF, and CRPF have been quite successful in reducing and eradicating Naxal violence. Why should we endanger the lives of civilians? It is the responsibility of law enforcement to safeguard citizens' lives and freedoms, but not to endanger them. Involving the locals in the anti-Naxal movement would be a stupid move. Odisha does not have a people's army to combat the Naxal threat. Various actions are being taken by state security officers to lessen the connections between locals and tribal people and the Naxalites.

According to one of the Odisha government's DIG police, the police's responsibility is to safeguard the state's law and order situation as well as the lives and liberties of its citizens. Police are

not responsible for severing tribal members' ties to Naxalite organisations. Due to some unforeseen circumstances, authorities were unable to reach the people in the past. The cops are now extremely vigilant and aware of any issues. In general, the police officers in the Naxal-affected area are more understanding and amiable. They are aware that their actions should not resemble those of British police. They travel from village to village, build personal relationships with the impoverished tribal people and other marginalised groups, and teach them to oppose the Naxalite threat. Many CMAS members who sympathise with the Naxals are now turning themselves in to the Koraput police after being cut off from the Naxal organisations and forming an alliance with the district government. Through the district administration, the district police are putting on various awareness programs. They also plan camps, medical facilities, entertainment events, sports, prize distributions, and more. He clarified that in the undivided Koraput district, the government is creating roads, buildings, enhancing health facilities, and providing both official and informal education to the local population and tribal members.

## ANTI - NAXL OPERTION

The former Home Secretary of Odisha responded during the interview that the state's government has implemented a multifaceted approach to eradicate naxalism. In order to combat the aggression of the Naxals, the state is recruiting new officers, modernising the police force, and offering specialised training. Huge sums of money are also being spent by the state to improve the socioeconomic standing of the underprivileged and destitute in the Naxal-affected area. To improve the quality of life for those living in the Naxal-affected area, the state has started a number of assistance programs.

The Odisha Home Department's special secretary acknowledged that the anti-Naxal campaign has reduced Naxal violence and eliminated the threat in certain areas. To curb the exploitation of the impoverished and indigenous people in the Naxal-affected area, the state is taking significant action. The state government is extremely aware of the problem and is directing district officials to find quick solutions to the tribal people's problems. Coordination across the line departments makes it possible for welfare

programs to be implemented quickly and reach previously unreachable masses.

Former Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde told the members that the government has implemented a multifaceted strategy in collaboration with the states impacted by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) by implementing various interventions in the domains of development, security, rights and entitlement, and governance enhancement. Through a variety of programs, including the Fortified Police Station Scheme, the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), the Security Related Expenditure (SRE), the Civic Action Program, the establishment of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism Schools (CIAT), and the augmentation of India Reserve Battalions (IRBs), the Home Minister said the government has improved the capacity building of the State Police Forces. Anti- Naxal operation will be more effective if the government adopts the following steps:

1. Taking the administration in to the grass root level in different part of the fifth schedule areas;
2. Police should not only be confined to maintain law and order but to extend their activities in Naxal areas and
3. Inter-state Naxal Operation at political level should be encouraged

The interstate anti-Naxal operation is in utter chaos. It is restricted to particular areas and locales. The CMs of many states do not belong to the same wave length. There will be no unified political meeting of the affected states. Only the SP, DIG, and IG levels are affected by this. Without a certain, Malkanagiri and Koraput, two Maoist strongholds, have now fallen. The police now control the Narayanpatna block of Koraput thanks to widespread surrenders by members of the pro-Maoist Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha.

Anti- Naxal Operation is not a total war. It is a conflict fought against certain people in particular places. It's not a sweeping conflict. This kind of marital dispute is unique to each individual and place. The police and Naxal are at war. It differs from the conflict between India and Pakistan or China. There is no conflict. We're killing them to protect ourselves. Instead of killing them, we intentionally harm them. We will kill them if we think they are about to kill us.

The state police, under the leadership of a new DGP, have dealt Maoists a number of severe blows in the last year without giving up much in one of the most difficult terrains in the nation. The conflict between the police and the Naxals can be described as a psychological conflict. In the midst of this war are the innocent tribal people. For decades, they have been completely ignored by the government, tortured and terrorised by the rebels, and mistreated by the security forces. Not all naxals are fighting for the nation's millions of oppressed and despondent poor people. They have directly attacked police officers across the nation in a psychological war. Even the Naxals are profiting from the local government's ineptitude. Their ideology is being spread. Thousands of tribal members, including women and children, have been taught by Maoists to fight as foot troops. They have learnt how to construct remote-control explosive detonators and lay landmines. The ideology of the Naxalites has been brainwashed to oppose landlordism and the local government apparatus.

According to a member of civil society, the central security forces and the state both employ oppressive tactics against the tribal people. They even have suspicions about the Dhais or doctors who treat people in the woods. The indigenous people endure inhumane torture and continual persecution, and their living conditions are appalling. The security forces of several states coordinate to varying degrees to launch anti-Naxal operations. SPs from various districts afflicted by Naxal work together to launch anti-Naxal operations in the state. To eradicate the Naxal threat in the state, anti-Naxal operations are conducted across the state and across districts. Additionally, there are state-level and district-level meetings, strategy, commandly and interstate operations, a clear-cut anti-Naxal operation principle, and standard operations that show how well the security forces of various states coordinate to conduct anti-Naxal operations. The government has established Combined Special Operation Groups comprising state police forces and CRPF to combat Left-wing extremists in an attempt to better coordinate anti-Naxal operations.

Existing businesses in the corresponding Naxal-affected states are giving the teams the necessary logistical and other support. In order to improve cooperation between state and central forces, the

local police are informed of the Naxals' movements and methods of operation. The local police speak the local language and are well-versed in Naxal operations. In the state's Compact Revolution Zone (CRZ), the CRPF and Special Operation Groups work together to conduct anti-Naxal operations. Every state must create an action plan, improve and fortify its police forces, and bolster its intelligence networks in order to carry out anti-Naxal operations. It is the duty of the state to appoint a nodal officer to deal with Naxal related issues and better coordination among the states and Central government.

There are few interstate operations since there is no justification or purpose for them. Interdisciplinary combining, however, is common. The DG police and the DG CRPF use the Incident Command system. The term "a systematic tool used for the command, control, and coordination of emergency response" refers to the Incident Command System (ICS). During the Andhra Naxal operation, the Odisha state administration treated the issue casually and without concern. Over time, the AP Naxals spread over various parts of Odisha and built a foundation of support.

According to the senior police personnel, the anti-naxal operation will not entirely stop the current naxal movement. The state's Naxal violence has undoubtedly decreased as a result of the anti-Naxal operation. The rate of violence in Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, has decreased. Sambalpur, Jajpur, etc. In the context of Odisha, the state government uses the DVF force, SOG, and Cobra battalion. They have made significant progress in the anti-Naxal campaign. Despite facing some of the most difficult terrain in the nation, the state police have dealt Maoists a number of serious blows without giving up much.

The frequency of anti-Naxal operations has resulted in a noticeable decrease in Naxal violence in the districts of Koraput and Malkanagiri. Many members of the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh are now turning themselves in to the local police. The Naxal threat has now been contained in Koraput's Bandhugaon and Narayanpatna blocks.

Speaking to the State Assembly on December 3, 2012, former Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik asserted that "strong action" by Security Forces (SFs) was helping the situation in districts affected by Naxal [Left Wing Extremism (LWE)]. "This

year, there has been no Maoist [Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)] violence in districts like Jajpur, Dhenkanal, Nayagarh, Deogarh, Mayurbhanj, Sambalpur, and Gajapati, but there were ultras in Koraput, Malkangiri, Nuapada, Bolangir, Bargarh, Kalahandi, and Nabarangpur District," he added. In an earlier reply in the Assembly on September 3, 2012, he had claimed that LWE activities had considerably reduced in nine of the 19 Maoist-hit Districts – Rayagada, Gajapati, Ganjam, Nayagarh, Jajpur, Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj, Sambalpur and Deogarh (SAPT, 2013).

Massive quantities of ammunition and firearms were also recovered by the police. The emphasis on gathering human intelligence and the complete support provided to SPs, who are now the centre of anti-Naxal operations, are the two main changes in Odisha's anti-Maoist operations. The level of Naxal violence in the undivided Koraput district has undoubtedly decreased as a result of the anti-Naxal operation. However, it is not completely eradicated. The issue would worsen and affect the lives and property of ordinary Koraput residents if the long-term action plan is not followed.

In an attempt to control the populace, various Naxalite factions have created their own interstate bordering zone. It is evident that Odisha is not an island of Maoism. It must be read in light of AP, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh. Odisha will host the AP Naxal and Chhattisgarh cadres. Their Red Corridor is being dispersed throughout the state. The Odisha police and police from other states must adopt a cooperative strategy to curb the Naxal threat in the state. It should be common practice to conduct joint patrols, joint arrests, vehicle inspections, and state border anti-Naxal operations. It's happening slowly. It has been noted in recent years that the lack of political will among the chief ministers of the Naxal-affected states has prevented them from coordinating together. Operation Green Hunt, for instance, was initiated by Naveen Patnaik. In Bihar, Nitish Kumar questioned why we should murder our own people. The Naxal threat in various states will be eliminated due to the divergent views of political leaders in those states about anti-Naxal operations. To eradicate naxalism from the nation, all political parties in the various states must work together. The state government has adopted some strategies to build pressure on

Naxalites to surrender before the state police. These are

- 1) Financial package
- 2) Attractive Rehabilitation Package
- 3) Non violence adoption
- 4) Withdrawal of petty cases
- 5) Proper settlement of Family members
- 6) Frequent anti-Naxal operation

To eliminate Naxal violence from the soil of India, the government has adopted three golden words: (1) Clear (you have to clear bases, hide out arms) (2) Kill (Top leaders to be killed) (3) Develop (Jobs to local people through different welfare schemes).

The Central Government closely monitors the situation and supplements and coordinates their efforts in several ways. These include providing Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (COBRA); sanction of India Reserve (IR) battalions, setting up of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism (CIAT) schools; modernization and upgradation of the State Police and their Intelligence apparatus under the Scheme for Modernization of State Police Forces (MPF scheme); re-imbursement of security related expenditure under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme; filling up critical infrastructure gaps under the Scheme for Special Infrastructure in Left Wing Extremism affected States; providing helicopters for anti-Naxal operations, assistance in training of State Police through the Ministry of Defense, the Central Police Organisations and the Bureau of Police Research and Development; sharing of Intelligence; facilitating inter-State coordination; assistance in community policing and civic action programmes etc.

## STATE-LED RESPONSES TO THE NAXAL MOVEMENT

To lessen the Naxal threat in the state and offer emotional support to the police stationed in Naxalite-infested areas, the state government has implemented a number of integrated programs. The state-implemented integrated schemes are listed below, in order of implementation:



## (a) Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme

The non-plan Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme has been in effect since April 1, 1996. The Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme provides funds for community policing, security-related infrastructure for village defence committees, publicity materials, training and operational needs of the security forces, insurance, and rehabilitation of Left Wing Extremist cadres who surrender in line with the State Government's surrender and rehabilitation policy. The funds used for anti-Maoist operations and the development of police infrastructure are fully reimbursed by the Union government under SRE.

With the latest inclusion, 19 out of 30 districts in Odisha would benefit under the central scheme, official sources said. "For the 15 districts, the state used to get around Rs 80-90 crore per annum as reimbursement. With the addition of four more districts, the central assistance should cross Rs 100 crore a year, 19 districts in Odisha are covered under SRE Scheme. These districts are Gajapati, Ganjam, Keonjhar, Koraput, Malkanagiri, Mayurbhanj, Navarangpur, Rayagada, Sambalpur, Sundergarh, Nayagarh, Kandhamal, Deoghar, Jajpur and Dhenkanal. Among the 19 districts, there are five focused districts i.e. Gajapati, Malkanagiri, Rayagada, Sambalpur and Deoghar. Nuapada, Balangir, Bargarh and Kalahandi districts have been included under SRE Scheme.

## (b) Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS)

In order to address major infrastructure shortages that cannot be addressed by the current schemes, the Eleventh Plan approved the Scheme for Special Infrastructure in Leftwing Extremism Affected States, allocating Rs. 500 crore. These include measures to improve security for police stations and outposts situated in vulnerable areas, the provision of secure camping grounds and helipads at key locations in remote and interior areas, and the upgrading of existing roads and tracks in inaccessible areas to meet the needs of police and security forces in terms of mobility. This program has now been extended to include funding for the modernisation of the Special Forces of LWE-affected States' equipment, weapons.

## (c) Central Scheme for Assistance to Civilian Victims/Family of Victims of Terrorist, Communal and Naxal Violence

The broad aim of the Scheme is to assist families of victims of Terrorist, Communal and Naxal violence. An amount of Rs. 3 lakh is given to the affected family under the scheme. The assistance given to those who are adversely affected by Naxal violence under this scheme is in addition to the ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1 lakh paid under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme.

## (d) Integrated Action Plan

The Integrated Action Plan (IAP) for 82 Selected Tribal and Backward Districts is being implemented by the Planning Commission in order to expedite development. This initiative's goal is to offer public services and infrastructure in the 82 impacted or adjacent districts. Initially, in the fiscal years 2010–11 and 2011–12, 60 Districts received a total of Rs. 25 crores and Rs. 30 crores, respectively. The entire coverage of this scheme presently stands at 82 districts after it was expanded to 22 more LWE-affected districts.

The nature of major works/projects taken up by the districts under the IAP include construction of School Buildings / School Furniture, Anganwadi Centres, Drinking Water Facilities, Rural Roads, Panchayats Bhawan / Community Halls, Godowns / PDS shops, livelihood activities, skill development/ trainings, Minor Irrigation Works, Electric Lighting, Health Centres/Facilities, Ashram Schools, construction of Toilets, construction of multi-purpose chabutra, construction of passenger waiting hall, special coaching classes for students, construction of ANM Centres, development of play grounds etc.

## (e) Road Requirement Plan for LWE areas

In order to improve road connectivity in 34 districts that are severely affected by LWE in eight states—Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Uttar Pradesh—the Road Requirement Plan (RRP) Phase-I was authorised in February 2009. At a cost of Rs. 7300 crore, the RRP-I plans to build 1126 km of National Highways and 4351 km of State Roads, for a total of 5477 km. Up until August 31, 2013, 2620 kilometres had been constructed at a cost of Rs 3296 crores.

#### (f) Scheme of Fortified Police Stations

Without adequate infrastructure, police stations are prime targets for Maoists. These stations are attacked, and all weapons and ammo are looted. Maoists will find it difficult to target a fortified police station with at least 40 officers and contemporary communication equipment. The State police are now providing their officers with modern weapons as well.

In states afflicted by Naxal, the Ministry of Home Affairs has been carrying out a plan for the "construction/strengthening of fortified police stations." In the states impacted by the Naxal, 400 fortified police stations will be built under this scheme, with each station costing Rs. 2.00 crore. Eighty percent of each police station's cost would be covered by the Indian government. In Odisha, 70 police stations are to be built as part of this scheme. The fundamental unit of policing is the police station. A key component of the counter-LWE strategy is expanding the network of police stations in the LWE-affected areas.

#### (g) Civic Action Programme:

In an attempt to win over the villagers, central paramilitary personnel are planning to carry clothing, medication, and transistors rather than firearms in remote regions of states impacted by Naxal. At an estimated cost of Rs 20 crore annually, the military will run medical camps, skill development programs, and provide drinking water as part of a huge civil action program in Maoist-affected areas in an effort to win locals over. CAPFs are authorised to receive cash grants under this program in order to carry out civic engagement in the impacted states.

This excellent plan seeks to strengthen ties between the security forces and the local populace. They provided the peasants with a variety of goods, including note books, umbrellas, school bags, uniforms, shoes, geometry boxes, pens, agricultural implements, utensils, stationery, electrical, sanitary, and medical supplies. Through an all-in-one platform-based Civic Action Program that will be periodically organised, the troops would offer their assistance to the impoverished tribal people who are in dire need of free medical examinations and medications.

## REHABILITATION PACKAGE FOR POLICE

Where the Naxalite insurgency has severely impacted a region, the police function turns not just operational but intensely psychological and socio-political. Because of the high-risk situation and concentrated operational pressure, state governments as well as the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) have implemented rehabilitation and welfare packages for the police force. These initiatives are meant to provide morale, mental health, and institutional allegiance to forces deployed in disturbed areas.

### 1. Risk Allowance and Hardship Allowance

Police officers deputed in Naxal-infested areas are usually given risk/hardship allowances, which recompense for the risky nature of deputation. Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha pay monthly risk allowances or special duty allowances as part of the deal. A few states have implemented ex-gratia payment for injured or martyred police personnel during anti-Naxal operations, which may be ₹15 to ₹50 lakhs based on the rank and category of casualty.

### 2. Welfare Measures and Family Support

Dedicated welfare boards for the families of police martyrs have been established by a number of states, providing timely payment of pensions, children's education on a free basis, and employment to dependents on compassionate grounds. Plans such as "Police Family Welfare Schemes" and housing allowances also provide social security to families that suffer long-term dislocation and trauma because of the posting of their relatives in red zones.

### 3. Counseling, Skill Development, and Training

The mental strain of being stationed in Naxal-hit districts is tremendous. States have therefore started providing pre-deployment and post-deployment counseling, usually with the help of mental health experts. Training modules today place greater importance on not just combat preparedness but also stress management, trauma management, and building resilience so that personnel can be rehabilitated holistically.

#### 4. Career Progression and Awards

As motivation for service in high-risk zones, personnel are frequently recommended for accelerated promotion, medals for gallantry, and awards for distinguished service. Such recognition gives a sense of direction and heroism among the troops. Certain states have introduced tenure-based shifts to avoid burnout, with a view to not keeping police posted for overly extended periods of time in high-pressure settings.

#### 5. Infrastructure and Operational Support

Better working conditions, including improved living quarters, secure police stations, and upgraded arms/equipment, are part of the overall rehabilitation program to boost morale and operational effectiveness. Implementation of mobile health units, rest camps, and satellite communication networks provides physical and psychological safety to police personnel in outlying areas.

#### 6. Inter-State and Central Government Coordination

The central government, under the Security-Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, bears the burden of state-sponsored rehabilitation and welfare packages, thus leading to a more uniform and institutionalized system of assistance. Collaborative efforts also include exchange programs, joint training exercises, and best-practice workshops to build a national-level response framework.

The Odisha Civil Service (Compassionate Grant) Rules, 1964 and the Finance Department's Resolution No. 64/2001-53885/F, dated 02.11.2001, read with Resolution No. 61(2004) (pt)-41781/f, dated 24.09.2004, govern the approval of the Compassionate Grant for state police personnel operating in the Naxal affected area. The government was actively considering changing the state government's current compensation program for police officers who had been victims of Naxal violence.

## SURRENDERED AND REHABILITATION BENEFIT TO THE NAXALITES

**TABLE 1: TYPE OF FIRE ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES AND AMOUNT OF REWARD**

Sl No	Type of Fire Arms and Explosives	Amount of Reward
1	AK-47/56/74 Rifles	Rs 15.000 per weapon
2	UMG/GPMG/PICCA, RPG/Sniper Rifle	Rs 25.000 per weapon
3	Pistol /Revolvers	Rs 3.000 Per weapon
4	Rockets	Rs 1000 per weapon
5	Grenade/Hand Grenade/ Stick Grenade	Rs 500 per weapon
6	Remote Control Device	Rs 3000 each device
7	Ammunition of All Types	Rs 3/- per round
8	IED	Rs 1000 each
9	Mines	Rs 3000
10	Explosive Material	Rs 1000 per Kg
11	Wireless Sets (a) Short Range (b) Long range	Rs 1000 per each set Rs 5000 per each set
12	SAM Missiles	Rs 20000
13	Satelite Phone	Rs 10000
14	VHF/HF Communication systems	Rs 50000
15	Electronic Detonator Other Detonator	Rs 50/- Rs 10/-

Source: Home Department, Govt of Odisha

Government of Odisha, No ext-09/2012/484/c, Bhubaneswar dated 21.02.2012 revised Scheme for Left Wing Extremists. In order to wean away the misguided youths, who have joined Communist Party of India (Maoist) and its front organizations, bring them back to the mainstream and rehabilitate them, the state government of Odisha has approved a scheme for surrender and rehabilitation of left wing extremists vide home department notification No. 2756/C dated 20.06.2006. In the meantime, the ministry of Home affairs, GOI have also issued vide their letter No 1-18015/32/2007-NM-111 dated 26.8.2008 a revised guideline for surrender and rehabilitation of LWE with financial assistance and provision for employment and entrepreneurial opportunity to the surrendered Naxalites under, the security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme. In order to dovetail the provisions of the Central scheme into the state scheme and make it attractive the state government has decided to revise its scheme.

**Rehabilitation Package:** The Rehabilitation Package for surrenderee coming under Category. A will consist of one or more of the following benefits.

(1) Payment up to Rs 25,000/- for surrendering with the arms in working condition, live ammunition and explosives, calculated

The incentive given for surrender of the aforesaid arms shall be deposited in the form of a fixed deposit in joint names of surrenderee and nodal officer of the district and may be given to the surrenderee at the time of completion of 3 years after surrender and subject to good behaviour by the surrenderee.

## LEGISLATIVE MEASURES

These legislative steps seek to upgrade the standard of living of individuals living in the Naxal-affected regions and to draw them into the state apparatus, thus bringing about their disconnection from Naxalite control and insurgent behavior."

(a) Land Alienation

Through the enactment of the Odisha Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulation, 1956 (Regulation 2

of 1956), which went into effect on October 4, 1956, the necessary protective regulations were made to prevent scheduled tribes from being exploited by members of other communities regarding landed property and to check and regulate land alienation in the Scheduled Areas.

(b) Liquidation of Rural Indebtedness

In order to relieve small farmers, rural craftsmen, and agricultural workers of their debt, the State Government passed the Odisha Debt Relief Act, 1980, which went into force on March 13, 1981. Any debt incurred by a scheduled tribe debtor prior to the Act's implementation, along with any interest that may have been owed, will be considered fully paid off. In the event that a decree or order pertaining to a scheduled debtor is executed, no such obligation may be recouped from him or from his moveable or immovable property through attachment or auction. No civil court will consider a lawsuit or other action to recover debt or interest against a scheduled debtor.

(c) Bonded Labour

The bonded labour system was abolished in 1976 with the passage of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, a Centrally Sponsored Scheme. According to the Act's provisions, freed bonded labourers get socioeconomic rehabilitation and job possibilities, including self-employment, to prevent them from becoming enslaved again. As of the end of February 2001, 18,411 of the 19,167 STs that had been discharged had undergone rehabilitation.

(d) Forest Policy

The indigenous people typically have a symbiotic connection with the forests since they rely on a variety of forest products for their livelihood, including lumber, fodder, and saleable Minor Forest Produce (MFP) items like tendu leaves, sal seeds, mohua flowers, resins, etc. However, because of their simplicity, they are occasionally used by dishonest middlemen and forest contractors who deal in MFP materials. Numerous steps have been taken to stop the exploitation of tribal people, including the banning of private contractors and the Tribal Development Co-operative Corporation's acquisition of small-scale forest products.

(e) The Odisha Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property (by Scheduled Tribes) Regulation, 1956, (as Amended in 1993).

Alienation of tribal territory to anybody other than ST is forbidden by Section 3(1) of the Act unless approved in writing by a responsible authority. Illegal alienation and unapproved tribal land occupation must be returned to the tribal owners in accordance with Sections 3(2) and 3(a). The Tahsildar, who is currently the competent authority, has the power to expel unauthorised individuals from tribal land and to start legal action upon application from any interested party. Additionally, officers on Special Duty (Land Reforms) have been assigned specifically to handle these land alienation cases in Sundargarh, Panposh, Baliguda, Parlakhemundi, and Koraput.

(f) The Odisha Scheduled Areas Money Lender's Regulation 1967

The purpose of the act is to regulate and manage money lending operations in Scheduled Areas. The following Acts of Odisha State have been implemented in Scheduled Areas in addition to these two Regulations, which were specially passed by the Tribes Advisory Council.

(g) The Odisha Debt Relief Act, 1980

By deeming loans taken out by small farmers, rural craftsmen, and agricultural labourers prior to the measure's enactment as fully discharged, this measure offers relief to ST borrowers. As soon as the Act takes effect, a ST debtor's pledged properties will be released in their benefit. The Civil Courts are not allowed to hear any lawsuits or debt recovery processes. Sub-Collectors and Tahsildars have been given the authority to decide cases as Judicial Magistrates in summary trials for this reason.

(h) The Bonded labour System Abolition Act, 1976

In order to stop the economic and physical exploitation of the poorer segments of society, this act seeks to abolish the system of bonded labour. This act stipulates that anyone who forces someone to perform bonded labour once it has taken effect faces up to three years in prison and a fine of up to two thousand rupees and other penalties.

(i) The Odisha Land Reforms Act, 1960 (section 22 and 23)

The ST population residing outside of Scheduled Areas is protected against land alienation by this statute. Without the Revenue Officer's written consent, no tribal land may be given to someone who is not a member of the same community. Approximately 45% of the state's land is designated as a Scheduled Area, home to 62 distinct tribal tribes.

With socioeconomic roots, the Naxalite movement has grown increasingly intense as a result of shoddy development plans and strategies, uneven development, and unwarranted rehabilitation and resettlement schemes. Because of the state and federal governments' multifaceted strategies, Naxalite violence is gradually declining, and the movement's strength is eroding as a result of cadre arrests and surrender, appropriate surrender and rehabilitation policies, and coordinated development initiatives. The state's peacekeeping effort has been an ongoing endeavour to lessen the severity of violence.

## AN OVERVIEW

The research highlights the multi-pronged strategy adopted by the government of Odisha to contain the Naxalite insurgency in the erstwhile undivided Koraput district. While destruction and violence form the core of the Naxalite modus operandi, the state has pursued a strategy synthesizing security enforcement, developmental outreach, community engagement, and psychological operations. The focus on human intelligence, enhanced police-public relations, cultural interventions, and sensitization campaigns has greatly improved trust-building with tribal populations and law enforcement. Rehabilitation programs, civic action initiatives, and specialized efforts to disengage youth and women from Naxalite indoctrination demonstrate a wider peace-building agenda. Intelligence gaps, lack of confidence, and persistent fear among tribal people remain major impediments. The cautious approach of the state against the creation of civilian militias shows its will to maintain human rights and learn from the errors of parallel initiatives such as Salwa Judum. Overall, the Odisha model offers a balanced framework that combines security with socio-economic development to tackle the root causes of extremism.

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