Rabiul Karim1 and Johirul Islam2,*
1Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Asian University of Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh and 2Lecturer, Department of Social Work, Asian University of Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh
Email of corresponding author: johir@aub.ac.bd
Abstract: Bangladesh ranks 161st out of 180 countries in the 2024 Environmental Performance Index, highlighting serious weaknesses in environmental governance despite three decades of strong economic growth. This paper examines why democratic institutions in Bangladesh have struggled to support sustainable natural resource management. Drawing on political economy, institutional, and environmental governance perspectives, and the study uses a qualitative comparative approach to explore the relationship between democracy, institutions, and sustainability outcomes. The paper argues that Bangladesh exhibits a pattern of “electoral accountability without enforcement autonomy.” Citizens can raise environmental concerns through elections, parliamentary oversight, and public protest, but regulatory agencies often lack the independence and authority needed to act against politically connected polluters. Parliamentary records show that environmental questions increased by 340 percent between 2014 and 2024, while the Department of Environment imposed only 17 penalties on major industrial violators during the same period. Comparative evidence from India’s National Green Tribunal, which has disposed of more than 45,000 cases, and Vietnam’s provincial enforcement system, which issued 1,247 environmental penalties in 2023, suggests that institutional coordination and enforcement capacity—not democracy alone—are essential for sustainable resource governance. The study contributes to comparative political economy by separating democracy into electoral, participatory, and enforcement dimensions. It finds that Bangladesh’s main governance challenge is not political representation but weak regulatory enforcement. The paper recommends fixed three-year terms for district environmental officers, mandatory digital disclosure of environmental clearance certificates, and the appointment of specialized environmental magistrates in every administrative division.
Keywords: Political Economy; Natural Resource Governance; Environmental Enforcement; Institutional Fragmentation; Democracy; Bangladesh.